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Abstract 
As consumers exhibit relatively more self-control over healthy products by limiting the purchase quantity of 
vice choices and buying more virtue choices to adhere to healthy-eating goals, a price promotion has a stronger 
effect on virtue than vice choices of healthy food. In contrast, consumers exhibit relatively less self-control over 
unhealthy products and evaluate price promotions as a persuasive temptation mechanism; thus, a price 
promotion has a stronger effect on vice than virtue choices of unhealthy food. The results of the empirical 
analyses provide support for these hypotheses.  
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1. Introduction 
Products with virtuous features provide consumers with alternative choices to regular products, and retailers 
endeavor to use price promotions to propel sales of these products. Despite this, marketing scholars have paid 
intermittent attention to the effect of price promotions of virtue and vice products on sales using scanner data.  
Virtue and vice products are related concepts (Parreño-Selva et al. 2014). They differ in the gain and 
loss domain, such that relative vices refer to products that provide immediate benefits (e.g., the good taste of 
crisps) but delayed costs (e.g., obesity in the future) and relative virtues refer to products that have immediate 
costs (e.g., the bad taste of oat bran) but delayed benefits (e.g., good health in the future). Healthy and unhealthy 
foods fall into the category of relative virtue and vice products (Kivetz and Keinan 2006; Thomas et al. 2011), 
respectively. An unhealthy food offers an immediate gratifying experience but has negative long-term outcomes, 
and a healthy food offers a less gratifying experience in the short run but has fewer negative long-term outcomes 
(Wertenbroch 1998).  
Moreover, although retail sales of relative virtue and vice choices have proliferated in both healthy 
food (e.g., low-sugar vs. regular baked beans) and unhealthy food (e.g., low-fat vs. regular crisps), scant 
marketing research has shed light on whether the promotion effects of relative virtue or vice choices differ 
across healthy and unhealthy products. We uncover this neglected but important side of the price promotion 
effects of virtues and vices by hypothesizing that consumers have differential responses to the relative virtue and 
vice choices of healthy and unhealthy food. 
This study aims to contribute to the literature by generating a greater understanding of the debate over 
whether price promotions are more effective for virtue or vice products. To our knowledge, the only two studies 
related to price promotions of virtue and vice products using scanner data are those of Wertenbroch (1998) and 
Parreño-Selva et al. (2014). Wertenbroch (1998) proposes that consumers of vice products impose self-control 
by limiting the quantity bought and that this purchase quantity rationing makes them less likely to purchase 
large quantities in response to price promotions. This argument supports the observation that the price 
promotion effect is smaller for vice than virtue products. In contrast, Parreño-Selva et al. (2014) propose that 
anticipating long-term regret over not choosing vice products increases the propensity to choose vice over virtue 
at the moment of price promotion. Therefore, this argument supports a greater price promotion effect for vice 
than virtue products. These studies thus find opposite results as to whether the effect of price promotions is 
greater for vices or for virtues. These mixed findings suggest that the price promotion effect can be masked, and 
apart from factors such as purchase context (e.g., store type), marketing factors (e.g., brand type) and specific 
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food categories (e.g., utilitarian/hedonic), we surmise that this is due to a lack of a nuanced classification of 
virtues and vices. For example, the empirical evidence Parreño-Selva et al. (2014) provide is based on alcoholic 
and non-alcoholic beer. As beer is an addictive vice product (see Kivetz and Keinan 2006), their study examines 
the price promotion effect only on an unhealthy product.1 This leaves the question unanswered as to how the 
price promotion effects on relative vice and virtue choices vary across healthy and unhealthy products. We 
propose that a separate examination of relative vices and virtues for healthy and unhealthy products would shed 
more light on the price promotion effects of virtues and vices. We argue that the self-control pattern differs 
across healthy and unhealthy products, such that consumers exhibit more self-control over unhealthy products 
because their natural impulse to consume such products is stronger.  
In line with this argument, the price promotion effects of relative virtues and vices differ across healthy 
and unhealthy products. For healthy products, consumers exhibit relatively more self-control by limiting the 
purchase quantity of vice choices and are more likely to choose virtue choices to adhere to their healthy-eating 
goals. Therefore, the price promotion effects are smaller for virtue choices of healthy products than for vice 
choices. In contrast, for unhealthy products, consumers exhibit relatively less self-control and greater impulsive 
urges (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999); thus, temptation mechanisms such as price 
promotions (Nakamura et al. 2015) lead to vice choices of unhealthy products. Therefore, the price promotion 
effects are stronger for vice choices of unhealthy products than for virtue choices. This is the central point in the 
theoretical development of this study. To address this neglected but important issue, we provide a more nuanced 
classification of virtues and vices, which we divide into four categories, and compare the price promotion 
effects between them: (1) a healthy virtue product (HVT) refers to a product with virtuous features in a healthy 
food (e.g., low-sugar baked beans, low-calorie fruit juice), (2) a healthy vice product (HVC) refers to a product 
with no or fewer virtuous features in a healthy food (e.g., regular baked beans, regular fruit juice), (3) an 
unhealthy virtue product (UHVT) refers to a product with virtuous features in an unhealthy food (e.g., low-fat 
crisps, low-alcohol beer), and (4) an unhealthy vice product (UHVC) refers to a product with no or fewer 
virtuous features in an unhealthy food (e.g., regular crisps, regular beer). Moreover, as consumer choices differ 
across social classes and pricing strategies vary across store types, this study aims to provide generalized 
findings related to the price promotion effects of HVT, HVC, UHVT and UHVC across different social classes 
and store types. 
                                                          
1
 Following Kivetz and Keinan (2006), Thomas et al. (2010), and Wertenbroch (1998), we characterize vice products as unhealthy products. 
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2. Theoretical development and hypotheses  
This study hypothesizes that sales are more sensitive to the price promotion of a relative virtue choice than to 
that of a relative vice choice of healthy food and more sensitive to the price promotion of a relative vice choice 
than to that of a relative virtue choice of unhealthy food. We propose this for two reasons. First, self-control is 
less required for healthy food consumption than for unhealthy food consumption (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999; 
Thomas et al. 2010); thus, consumers are better able to adopt self-control by limiting their purchase quantity of 
vice choices in healthy than unhealthy food consumption (Wertenbroch 1998). Consumers of healthy products 
exhibit a deliberate and strong goal for healthy eating (Thomas et al. 2010); thus, they are more likely to adopt 
strong self-regulation to adhere to this important goal by purchasing more virtue than vice choices of healthy 
food in response to a price promotion. Second, consumers exhibit greater impulses to consume unhealthy food, 
and this causes more differential self-control problems (Ramanathan and Menon 2006; Shiv and Fedorikhin 
1999). Therefore, the price promotion is a tempting mechanism that depletes one’s self-regulation resources to 
justify vice choices of unhealthy food.  
Consumers exhibit distinct levels of self-control over healthy and unhealthy food. Self-control 
problems arise from impulsive behavior (Wertenbroch 1998). Baumeister (2002, p. 670) defines impulsive 
behavior as “behavior that is not regulated and that results from an unplanned, spontaneous impulse” and thus 
goes against one’s self-interest and long-term goals. Unhealthy foods are more likely to be consumed on 
impulse (overweigh present, immediate consequences) because impulsivity is an influential antecedent of 
unhealthy food consumption (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Rook 1987). The emotive imagery and associated 
desire for unhealthy products (e.g., cookies, doughnuts, cakes) trigger impulsive purchase decisions 
(Loewenstein 1996; Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999; Thomas et al. 2011; Wertenbroch 1998). This idea is in line with 
marketing scholars’ findings that the impulse to consume unhealthy food is stronger than that to consume 
healthy food (Talukdar and Lindsey 2013). Therefore, unhealthy food poses a greater need for self-control than 
healthy food.  
Moreover, healthy eating is a more mindful, planned, and deliberative behavior (see Thomas et al. 2010) 
because consumers often portray healthy eating as a goal. Therefore, purchase decisions associated with healthy 
products are more “deliberative” (Thomas et al. 2011) and reflect consumers’ healthy-eating goals. According to 
goal congruency theory (Fishbach and Zhang 2008), when an individual’s key goal is activated by a choice set, 
he or she is more likely to adhere to that goal and declare a positive evaluation of the congruent choice. This 
argument is built on research and theory related to the dynamics of self-regulation (Fishbach and Dhar 2005; 
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Fishbach et al. 2006). Self-regulation dynamics can be distinguished as highlighting and balancing dynamics, 
which Fishbach and Zhang (2008, p. 548) describe as follows: “in a highlighting dynamic, individuals 
consistently choose alternatives that are in alignment with the more important goal, whereas in a balancing 
dynamic, individuals alternate between that high-order goal and a low-order temptation in successive choices.” 
Thus, when an individual chooses to purchase a healthy product, a healthy-eating goal is activated and his or her 
self-regulation system enters a highlighting dynamic. Under such a dynamic, the individual puts higher value on 
the long-term goal (i.e., long and healthy life) than on the short-term goal (i.e., eating tasty but unhealthy food) 
and is more likely to make choices adhering to the long-term goal. Therefore, consumers are more likely to buy 
more relative virtue than vice choices of healthy food on sale.  
This argument leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1 A price promotion has a stronger effect on virtue choices of healthy food than on vice choices of 
healthy food. 
In contrast, we propose that price promotion effects are stronger for vice than virtue choices of 
unhealthy food because consumers have less self-control over unhealthy food and price promotions act as a 
tempting mechanism to provide a license/justification for making unhealthy vice choices.  
It is a well-established notion that consumers exhibit greater impulses to consume unhealthy food and 
have greater self-control problems over unhealthy food (Raghunathan et al. 2006; Ramanathan and Menon 2006; 
Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999; Ubel 2009; Vohs and Heatherton 2000). The impulsive consumption literature 
provides several reasons for this notion. Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) propose that unhealthy food is preferable to 
healthy food because of the individual’s natural affective responses to unhealthy food. Raghunathan et al. (2006) 
posit that individuals operate under the “unhealthy = tasty” intuition, which leads to the choice of unhealthy 
food. Vohs and Heatherton (2000) find that self-regulation failure is caused by the depletion of an underlying 
cognitive self-regulating resource. Ramanathan and Menon (2006) assert that impulsive behavior is driven by an 
activation chronicity of hedonic/pleasure-seeking goals. Moreover, it is more difficult to resist unhealthy than 
healthy food when the consumers’ utility from immediate gratification exceeds their disutility from long-term 
unhealthiness (Ubel 2009). Therefore, it is a steep challenge to regulate impulsive purchases and unhealthy food 
consumption. 
Moreover, the licensing effects of price promotions strengthen the preference for relative vice choices 
of unhealthy food by depleting consumers’ limited self-control resources. Consumers’ hedonic, visceral, and 
pleasure-seeking goals cause them to experience desires for unhealthy/indulgent/luxury products (Shiv and 
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Fedorikhin 2002). However, such goals may conflict with others, such as having healthy and long lives, and 
cause intense ambivalence (Ramanathan and Menon 2006). It is thus more difficult to justify the vice choices of 
unhealthy food over virtue choices. In line with the self-control literature, the licensing effect increases “the 
preference for a relative luxury by dampening the negative self-attributions associated with such items” (Khan 
and Dhar 2006, p. 264). Self-regulation resources are limited, and their depletion leads to self-regulation failure 
(Vohs and Heatherton 2000). Tempting mechanisms such as price promotions (see Nakamura et al. 2015) and 
credit (see Thomas et al. 2010) diminish one’s capacity for self-regulation by offering rewards (e.g., paying less, 
gaining credit, curbing pain of paying, relieving guilt) (Lee and Corfman 2010). Price promotions can thus lend 
justification for buying more impulsive choices (i.e., vice-unhealthy food). Therefore, consumers are more 
likely to buy more vice than virtue choices of unhealthy food on sale.   
This argument leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2 A price promotion has a stronger effect on vice choices of unhealthy food than on virtue choices of 
unhealthy food.  
3. Data and modeling approach 
Data collection took place at three types of grocery stores in the United Kingdom: hi-lo store, everyday low-
price store, and convenience store. We examined four product categories depending on their healthiness. 
According to the findings of one of the most thorough nutrient profiling surveys (see Scarborough et al. 2007), 
we categorized these four products as relatively healthy (i.e., baked beans and fresh fruit juices) or relative 
unhealthy (i.e., crisps and beer).2 Any brand labeled “low fat” (crisps), “low sugar” (baked beans), or “low 
calorie” (fresh fruit juices) represented the relative virtues within the product category. Owing to a lack of 
observations for non-alcoholic beer, we adopted an approach similar to Wertenbroch’s (1998) and contrasted 
regular and light beer.3 We categorized all the brands as relative virtue and relative vice sub-categories within 
each product category and applied the store/national brand indicator as another brand-related characteristic. 
Table 1 presents the overview cross-tabulation of choice (1 = virtue choice, 0 = vice choice). Approximately 10% 
                                                          
2
 We conducted a post-test on 95 random U.K. consumers to evaluate the degree of healthiness of baked beans, fresh fruit juices, crisps, and 
beer. The results show that 71% and 66% of the participants perceived baked beans and fresh fruit juices as healthy products, respectively, 
and 73% and 73% of the participants perceived crisps and beer as unhealthy products, respectively. Therefore, consumers’ perceptions of 
the classification of healthy versus unhealthy products for these four products are in accordance with this study. 
3
 Because 1%–4% alcohol by volume (ABV) is considered low alcohol content, we use any brand of beer labeled “ABV1.3 up to 3.3%” and 
“ABV 3.4 up to 4.1%” to present the relative virtue choice in this product category. As there is no specific “low ABV” label for beers, we 
conducted a post-test on 95 random U.K. consumers, and the results show that 82% of the participants considered low ABV beer healthier 
than regular beer. Furthermore, 70% of these participants reported that low ABV content was the key factor in identifying a 
healthier/unhealthier beer. 
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of all the purchases are relative virtue choices, with 56% of the virtue choices made on healthy food and 44% 
made on unhealthy food. 
---Take in Table 1 about here--- 
The transaction data set contains 1,497,243 observations for 18,097 U.K. households between October 
2002 and February 2009 across four product categories. The variables in this data set include quantity, price,4 
and amount paid, which can be matched with the product category and brand name through universal product 
codes (UPCs). Consumer demographic variables such as age, household size, and social class were collected 
from household surveys and can be matched with the transaction data set through consumer panel ID. Table 2 
shows the summary statistics of the variables. Beer has by far the largest price dispersion, and the most 
expensive beer costs 10 times more than the cheapest beer. We construct an indicator variable for virtuous 
features. When a category offers a virtuous feature of relative virtue ሺܴ���ሻ, its ܴ��� is 1 and 0 otherwise. Thus, 
the third panel in Table 2 shows that baked beans and beer with virtuous features are more frequently purchased 
across all the observations (11% and 18%, respectively) than fresh fruit juices and crisps (9% and 2%, 
respectively). The bottom panels of Table 2 present summary statistics related to consumer characteristics, 
including social class, age, and household size. Among the participant households in the data set, the primary 
shopper is 49 years of age on average (with the youngest 18 and the oldest 89) and has about 3 family members. 
---Take in Table 2 about here--- 
We adopt Wertenbroch’s (1998) model of the effect of price promotions on sales and consider the 
possible differences between relative virtue and vice choice within each product category: ݈݊ܳ�� = �଴ + �ଵܴ��� + �ଶ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁�� + �ଷܴ��� ∗ ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁�� + �ସ�ܤ�� + �ହܵ �ܶ + �଺ܵܥ� + �଻ܣܩ� + �଼ܪ �ܵ + ���,      
(1) 
where ݈݊ܳ�� is the logarithm of sales for UPC � at time ݐ, ܴ��� is an indicator of the choice (1 = relative virtue, 0 
= relative vice) for UPC �, ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁��  is the logarithm of the unit price paid for UPC � at time ݐ, �ܤ�� is an 
indicator of national brand (1 = national brand, 0 = store brand) for UPC � within each category ݇, ܵ �ܶ  is the 
type of stores visited for each shopping occasion, ܵܥ� is the social class for each household, ܣܩ� indicates the 
                                                          
4
 The quantity and prices are standardized because items sold within the same category may differ in terms of package size or be measured 
in inconsistent units. The quantity and price standardization details are available on request. 
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age of the primary shopper in each household, ܪ �ܵ  indicates the size of each household, and ��� is the error term 
(i.i.d. N ~ 0, σ2). 
Thus, the price promotion effect is ܲݎ�ܿ݁ܲݎ݋݉݋�� = {�ଶ + �ଷ               �݂ ܴ��� = ͳ     �ଶ                     �݂ ܴ��� = Ͳ . 
When �ଷ > Ͳ, the absolute value of the price coefficient of relative virtue is lower than the absolute value of the 
price coefficient of relative vice. In contrast, when �ଷ < Ͳ, the absolute value of the price coefficient of relative 
virtue is higher than the absolute value of the price coefficient of relative vice. Therefore, the significance level 
and sign of �ଷ determine how the price promotion effects vary across relative virtue and vice. The negative sign 
of �ଷ indicates that the price promotion effect is stronger for the relative virtue choice than the relative vice 
choice, and vice versa. 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Price promotion effects across healthy and unhealthy food 
We estimate the effects of price on sales for the relative virtue and vice choices of four product categories based 
on Model 1. Thus, we estimate four sales equations with three key variables of interest: �ଵ for ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁��, �ଶ for 
relative virtue, �ଷ for the interaction term of ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁�� and ܴ���, and the control variables. Table 3 shows the 
regression results of the price effects and various statistics. All four equations are significant at the 0.01 level, 
and the R-square values range from 0.1 to 0.7, indicating good model fit and high predictive adequacy. The 
variance inflation factors indicate that there are no multicollinearity problems in any of the equations. 
 
---Take in Table 3 about here--- 
 
As Table 3 shows, the estimated models suggest that, as expected, prices have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on sales in all four categories, ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁��. The coefficients of the interactive term, �ଷሺܴ��� × ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁��ሻ, are negative and significant for both the healthy products (ܤ�݇݁݀ ܤ݁�݊ݏ: �ଷ =−Ͳ.ͷʹͲ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳ; ܨݎ݁ݏℎ ܨݎݑ�ݐ �ݑ�ܿ݁ݏ: �ଷ = −Ͳ.ͳͷͺ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳሻ and positive and significant for both the 
unhealthy products (ܥݎ�ݏ݌ݏ: �ଷ = Ͳ.Ͳ͸Ͷ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳ; ܤ݁݁ݎ: �ଷ = Ͳ.ͻͲͷ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳሻ. The price elasticity of regular 
baked beans is –0.346 ሺ�ଶ = −Ͳ.͵Ͷ͸, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳሻ, and the price elasticity of low-sugar baked beans is the sum of �ଶ and �ଷ , or –0.866 (�ଶ = −Ͳ.͵Ͷ͸, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳ; �ଷ = −Ͳ.ͷʹͲ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳ). The price elasticity of regular fresh 
fruit juices is –0.358 ሺ�ଶ = −Ͳ.͵ͷͺ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳሻ, and the price elasticity of low-calorie fresh fruit juices is –0.516 
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(�ଶ = −Ͳ.͵ͷͺ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳ; �ଷ = −Ͳ.ͳͷͺ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳ). Thus, consumers are more sensitive to the price of low-
sugar baked beans than to regular baked beans and also more sensitive to the price of low-calorie fresh fruit 
juices than to regular fresh fruit juices. The price elasticity of crisps is –1.041 ሺ�ଶ = −ͳ.ͲͶͳ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳሻ, and the 
price elasticity of low-fat crisps is the sum of �ଶ and �ଷ , or –0.977 (�ଶ = −ͳ.ͲͶͳ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳ; �ଷ = Ͳ.Ͳ͸Ͷ, ݌ <Ͳ.Ͳͳ). The price elasticity of regular beer is –1.961 ሺ�ଶ = −ͳ.ͻ͸ͳ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳሻ, and the price elasticity of low-
alcohol beer is –1.056 (�ଶ = −ͳ.ͻ͸ͳ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳ; �ଷ = Ͳ.ͻͲͷ, ݌ < Ͳ.Ͳͳ). Thus, consumers are more sensitive to 
the price of regular crisps and regular beer than to the price of low-fat crisps and low-alcohol beer. Therefore, 
H1 and H2 are supported. 
4.2 Robustness check 
To test the robustness of the results of our main model (Model 1), we perform three additional checks. First, we 
test whether the results differ across store types. We estimate 12 sales equations for four product categories 
purchased in the hi-lo, everyday low-price, and convenience stores, respectively. The 12 store-type equations 
are based on Model 1 without using ܵ �ܶ  as a control variable. Second, we test whether the results differ across 
consumer groups. We estimate an additional 12 sales equations for four product categories purchased by lower-, 
medium-, and higher-level social class groups, respectively. Similar to the store-type equations, the 12 social 
class equations are based on Model 1 without using ܵܥ� as a control variable. Overall, we estimate 192 
parameters for 24 equations for the first and second robustness checks. To simplify our results, we present only 
three coefficients for each equation in Table 4: �ଵ for ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁��, �ଶ for relative virtue, and �ଷ for the interaction 
term ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁��  × relative virtue. 
---Take in Table 4 about here--- 
As Table 4 shows, the across-store-type results and the across-consumer-group results in Table 4 are 
consistent with the overall results shown in Table 3. In summary, we find consistent price promotion effect 
patterns on the relative virtue and vice choices of healthy and unhealthy food across the different types of stores 
and different consumer groups. 
Third, we test whether the results vary across model specifications with a set of regressions for each 
product category. Model 2 includes three key predictors—Relative Virtue (ܴ���ሻ, lnPrice (݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁��ሻ, and ܴ��� × ݈݊ܲݎ�ܿ݁�� . Model 3 includes three key predictors and the demographic characteristics (i.e., social class, 
age and household size). Model 4 includes three key predictors and the marketing factors (i.e., brand type and 
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store type). The results of Models 2–4 are consistent with those of Model 1.5 Furthermore, price elasticities are 
consistent across models, such that baked beans and fruit juices have relatively smaller price elasticities than 
crisps and beer. The former two are necessity products and less price elastic than the latter two, which are 
indulgent products. In addition, the model specification of Model 1 outperforms specifications of Models 2–4. 
5. Discussion 
This study extends existing literature in two important ways. First, it directly compares the effects of price 
promotions on the relative virtue and vice choices of healthy food sales (e.g., low-sugar vs. regular baked beans) 
and relative virtue and vice choices of unhealthy food sales (e.g., low-fat vs. regular crisps). Second, it provides 
generalized finding of these effects using scanner sales data combined with store type and social class 
information. The hypotheses are based on the different levels of self-control consumers need when purchasing 
healthy and unhealthy food (the degree of impulse buying) and goal congruency theory. Data analysis 
empirically reveals a greater price promotion effect on relative vice choices of unhealthy food (i.e., beer and 
crisps) than on relative virtue choices, but a smaller price promotion effect on relative vice choices of healthy 
food (i.e., baked beans and fresh fruit juices) than on relative virtue choices. Moreover, the effect pattern of 
price promotions on the relative virtue and vice choices of healthy and unhealthy food is constant across 
different types of stores and different groups of consumers. 
In addition, the study shows that examining the price promotion effects of relative virtue and vice 
choices without conceptualizing the price promotion effects across healthy and unhealthy products separately is 
inappropriate, as the effects of price promotions differ across these products. For healthy food, as predicted, 
demand for relative vice choices is less price sensitive, resulting in a crossover of demand as prices increase. In 
other words, demand for relative vice choices is increasingly constrained when price constraints are relaxed 
during the price promotion period, even if these choices are more palatable than their virtue counterparts. 
Moreover, healthy eating is deliberative, and consumers are engaged in a highlighting dynamic of regulation 
when they purchase healthy food; thus, they are more likely to buy more virtue choices of healthy food on sale 
to adhere to their healthy-eating goals. This finding lends support to our contention that consumers are more 
capable of adhering to a self-imposed constraint on vices in healthy food consumption than in unhealthy food 
consumption. 
In contrast, price promotions play a more vital role in boosting sales of relative vice choices of 
unhealthy than healthy food. For unhealthy food, demand for relative vice choices is more price sensitive, 
                                                          
5
 Results are available on request. 
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resulting in a sales boost through the price promotion. This finding confirms the notion that consumers exhibit a 
greater impulse for unhealthy than healthy food. Moreover, price promotion functions as a tempting mechanism 
to justify relative vice over virtue choices of unhealthy food. Thus, stronger impulsiveness in unhealthy food 
consumption and the temptation of price promotions explain why consumers are more price sensitive to relative 
vice choices of unhealthy food than to relative virtue choices of unhealthy food.  
The effect pattern, which shows that the effects of price promotions on relative virtues and vices are 
constant across different types of stores, indicates that the different pricing strategies of stores are not factors 
that drive consumers to choose virtues over vices. Consumers exhibit a similar choice pattern in choosing 
relative virtues and vices when they shop across different stores. Furthermore, the price promotion effects of 
relative virtues and vices are consistent within each social class of consumers. Thus, even if consumers have 
different reasons for choosing virtues over vices and different price sensitivities across social classes, the 
stronger effect of virtue in price promotions for healthy food and the weaker effect of virtue in price promotions 
for unhealthy food do not change across social classes. This implies that consumers’ degree of impulse buying 
and the self-control problem are the dominant factors determining the effectiveness of price promotions on 
relative virtues and vices across healthy and unhealthy food.  
These results have important managerial implications, especially for retailers that want to propel sales 
of both virtues and vices in healthy and unhealthy foods and manufacturers that want to negotiate profitable 
marketing plans with retailers. In particular, the stronger effect of virtue in price promotions for healthy food 
and the weaker effect of virtue in price promotions for unhealthy food indicate that marketing managers should 
differentiate price promotions for different types of products. Manufacturers of healthy food should give priority 
to price promotions for relative virtue choices because these promotions are more profitable than those for 
relative vice choices. For example, Heinz should negotiate with retailers to develop joint sales plans that focus 
on price promotion activities for low-sugar rather than regular baked beans. In contrast, manufacturers of 
unhealthy food should prioritize price promotions for relative vice choices because such promotions are more 
profitable than those for relative virtue choices. For example, Pringles should persuade retailers to conduct price 
promotion plans more frequently on its regular rather than reduced-fat crisps. Moreover, retailers and 
manufacturers need to lower their expectations of the effects of price promotions on relative virtue choices in 
unhealthy food and relative vice choices in healthy food. For example, retailers should encourage Heineken to 
self-fund the price promotion costs of its low-alcohol products. They should also suggest that Tropicana 
decrease the price promotion frequency on its regular orange juice. Our findings show the danger of adopting a 
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homogeneous price promotion strategy for different types of food and provide valuable information for retailers 
and manufacturers to make joint price promotion decisions to attract consumer support and purchases. 
The findings also provide useful information for public policy makers to effectively decrease unhealthy 
vice purchases. That price promotion has a stronger effect on the vice than virtue choices of unhealthy food 
indicates that price is a strong stimulus triggering more vice-unhealthy food than virtue- unhealthy food. 
Limiting the frequency of price promotions to vice-unhealthy food can effectively curb the temptation 
mechanism and thus drive consumers to purchase less vice-unhealthy food. Applying surcharges to vice-
unhealthy food is a straightforward way to highlight financial disincentives and therefore significantly drive 
healthier consumption choices.   
This study has some limitations that should be considered when interpreting its results and 
contributions. The first limitation pertains to our measure of the effectiveness of price promotions. Our 
arguments focus mainly on the own price promotion effect of each type of product. Although empirical research 
has demonstrated the cross-effects of price promotions (see Parreño-Selva et al. 2014), we cannot argue that our 
study captures this effect, due to a lack of store-level transaction data to estimate cross-effects. The second 
limitation involves the number of products examined in this study. Although we examined four products, a lack 
of consumer-level transaction data prevented us from including additional products. 
Our findings also provide avenues for further research. We assess consumer purchase behavior only 
from scanner data. A lab experiment could be conducted to test the psychological process (e.g., impulsiveness, a 
highlighting dynamic of regulation) behind buying behavior. A 2 (virtue/vice) × 2 (healthy/unhealthy) × 2 
(promotion yes, promotion no) design with attitudinal and process-dependent variables could extend scanner 
data–based studies to delineate the psychological process. Such a study could be distinguished strongly from 
investigations based solely on scanner data. Moreover, that low-fat labeling increases food consumption for both 
normal-weight and overweight people (Wansink and Chandon 2006) suggests that consumers’ actual 
consumption of relative virtue/vice products is different from their purchases of such products (especially price-
incentivized purchases). Thus, future studies could investigate price promotion effects by accounting for the 
differences between purchases and actual consumption of relative virtue/vice products. In addition, the price 
promotion effects may vary between current and future choice behavior because buying virtues at time ݐ may 
lead to buying vices at time ݐ + ͳ (Hui et al. 2009). Therefore, future studies could explore the degree to which 
price promotion effects vary from time ݐ to time ݐ + ͳ according to consumers’ previous choices between 
relative virtues and vices.  
 14 
References   
Baumeister, R. F. (2002). Yielding to temptation self-control failure impulsive purchasing and consumer 
behavior. Journal of Consumer Research, 28(4), 670-676.  
Fishbach, A., & Zhang, Y. (2008). Together or apart: When goals and temptations complement versus 
compete. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(4), 547-559. 
Fishbach, A., & Dhar, R. (2005). Goals as excuses or guides: The liberating effect of perceived goal progress on 
choice. Journal of Consumer Research, 32(December), 370-377. 
Fishbach, A., Dhar, R., & Zhang, Y. (2006). Subgoals as substitutes or complements: The role of goal 
accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(2), 232-242. 
Hoch, S. J., & Loewenstein, G. F. (1991). Time-inconsistent preferences and consumer self-control. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 17(4), 492-507.  
Hui, S. K., Bradlow, E. T., & Fader, P. S. (2009). Testing behavioral hypotheses using an integrated model of 
grocery store shopping path and purchase behavior. Journal of Consumer Research, 36(3), 478-493. 
Khan, U. & Dhar, R. (2006). Licensing effect in consumer choice. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(May), 
259-266.  
Kivetz, R., & Keinan, A. (2006). Repenting hyperopia: An analysis of self-control regrets. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 33(2), 273-282.  
Lee-Wingate, S. N., & Corfman, K. P. (2010). A little something for me and maybe for you too: Promotions that 
relieve guilt. Marketing Letters, 21, 385-395.  
Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 65(3), 272-292.  
Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool system analysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower. 
Psychological Review, 106(January), 3-19. 
Nakamura, R., Suhrcke, M., Jebb, S. A., Pechey, R., Almiron-Roig, E., & Marteau, T. M. (2015). Price 
promotions on healthier compared with less healthy foods. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 
101(4), 808-816. 
Parreño-Selva, J., Mas-Ruiz, F. J., & Ruiz-Conde, E. (2014). Price promotions effects of virtue and vice 
products. European Journal of Marketing, 48(7-8), 1296-1314.  
Raghunathan, R., Walker-Naylor, R., & Hoyer, W. D. (2006). The unhealthy = tasty intuition and its effects on 
taste inferences, enjoyment, and choice of food products. Journal of Marketing, 70(4), 170-184. 
Ramanathan, S., & Menon, G. (2006). Time-varying effects of chronic hedonic goals on impulsive behavior. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 43(4), 628-641. 
Rook, D. (1987). The buying impulse. Journal of Consumer Research, 14(September), 189-199. 
Scarborough, P., Rayner, M., Stockley, L., & Black, A. (2007). Nutrition professionals’ perception of the 
‘healthiness’ of individual foods. Public Health Nutrition, 10(4), 346-353.  
Shiv, B., & Fedorikhin, A. (1999). Heart and mind in conflict: The interplay of affect and cognition in consumer 
decision making. Journal of Consumer Research, 26(3), 278-292.  
Talukdar, D., & Lindsey, C. (2013). To buy or not to buy: Consumers’ demand response patterns for healthy 
versus unhealthy food. Journal of Marketing, 77(2), 124-138.  
 15 
Thomas, M., Desai, K. K., & Seenivasan, S. (2011). How credit card payments increase unhealthy food 
purchases: Visceral regulation of vices. Journal of Consumer Research, 38(1), 126-139.  
Ubel, P. A. (2009). Free market madness. Boston: Harvard Business Press. 
Vohs, K. D., & Heatherton, T. F. (2000). Self-regulatory failure: A resource-depletion approach. Psychological 
Science, 11(3), 249-254. 
Wansink, B., & Chandon, P. (2006). Can “low-fat” nutrition labels lead to obesity? Journal of Marketing 
Research, 43(4), 605-617. 
Wertenbroch, K. (1998). Consumption self-control by rationing purchase quantities of virtue and vice. 
Marketing Science, 17(4), 317-337.   
  
 16 
Table 1 Cross-tabulation of relative virtue and relative vice choices 
Baked Beans Fresh Fruit Juices  Crisps Beer Total 
Relative Virtue 33,461 46,359 7,149 54,463 141,432 
Relative Vice 267,589 456,347 381,515 250,351 1,355,802 
Total 301,050 502,706 388,664 304,814 1,497,234 
 
Unhealthy Healthy Total 
  Relative Virtue 61,612 79,820 141,432 
  Relative Vice 631,866 723,936 1,355,802 
  Total 693,478 803,756 1,497,234 
  
 
Store Type 
    
 
Convenience Everyday Low Price Hi-lo  Total 
 Relative Virtue 2,884 23,600 114,948 141,432 
 Relative Vice 34,463 155,861 1,166,478 1,356,802 
 Total 37,347 179,461 1,281,426 1,498,234 
 
 
Social Class 
   
 
Low Medium High Total 
 Relative Virtue 15,223 82,691 43,518 141,432 
 Relative Vice 148,844 807,176 399,782 1,355,802 
 Total 164,067 889,867 443,300 1,497,234 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
Baked Beans Fresh Fruit Juices Crisps Beer 
     Observation (301,050) (502,706) (388,664) (304,814) 
Quantity 
    
     Mean 2.47 1.85 9.60 2.63 
     SD 1.80 1.44 8.83 2.78 
     Min 1 0.25 1 0.25 
     Max 48 36 288 42.24 
Unit Price 
    
     Mean 0.28 0.75 0.26 2.02 
     SD 0.18 0.43 0.33 0.79 
     Min 0.01 0.02 0 0.45 
     Max 2.82 7.4 3.42 5 
Relative Virtue 
   
     Mean 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.18 
     SD 0.31 0.29 0.13 0.38 
     Min 0 0 0 0 
     Max 1 1 1 1 
National Brand 
   
     Mean 0.46 0.28 0.72 0.89 
     SD 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.32 
     Min 0 0 0 0 
     Max 1 1 1 1 
Social Class 
   
     Observation 18,097 
   
     Mean 2.21 
   
     SD 0.6 
   
     Min 1 
   
     Max 3 
   Age 
    
     Mean 48.51 
   
     SD 15.72 
   
     Min 18 
   
     Max 89 
   Household Size 
   
     Mean 2.70 
   
     SD 1.34 
   
     Min 1 
   
     Max 10 
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Table 3 Parameter estimates for the four product categories—Model 1 
Dependent Variable: 
lnQuantity 
Baked Beans Fresh Fruit Juices Crisps Beer 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Relative Virtue -0.703*** (-13.29) -0.113*** (-8.92) 0.064+ (1.68) -0.491*** (-9.94) 
lnPrice -0.346*** (-43.91) -0.358*** (-46.94) -1.041*** (-212.05) -1.961*** (-46.86) 
Relative Virtue × lnPrice -0.520*** (-13.30) -0.158*** (-6.74) 0.064** (3.22) 0.905*** (11.36) 
National Brand 0.315*** (26.88) 0.048*** (6.85) 0.071*** (9.50) 0.641*** (11.57) 
Store Type (Convenience Store as Base) 
      Everyday Low Price 0.055+ (1.94) 0.027 (1.43) 0.227*** (7.01) 0.018 (0.21) 
Hi-lo 0.168*** (6.44) 0.096*** (5.89) 0.321*** (10.35) 0.256** (3.08) 
Social Class (Lower Social Class as Base) 
      Medium -0.020 (-1.06) -0.076*** (-5.44) -0.001 (-0.05) 0.057* (1.99) 
High -0.029 (-1.48) -0.117*** (-7.88) -0.010 (-0.58) 0.044 (1.35) 
Age -0.003*** (-7.62) 0.001* (2.16) -0.000 (-0.87) -0.000 (-0.57) 
Household Size 0.073*** (15.58) 0.049*** (13.24) 0.063*** (14.72) 0.020* (2.46) 
Number of Observations 301,050 
 
502,706 
 
388,664 
 
304,814 
 F-statistics 
 
F(10, 11568)=272.84 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(10,11351)=305.76 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(10, 11240)=5030.29 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(10,11258)=307.52 
Prob>F=0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.104 
 
0.122 
 
0.712 
 
0.523 
 RMSE 0.598 0.521 0.535 0.667 
AIC 544459  772126  616764  618499  
BIC 544342  772004  616644  618382 
 
+
 p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
t statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 4 Parameter estimates across store types and social class† 
Dependent Variable: 
lnQuantity 
Store Types Social Class 
Convenience  
Everyday  
Low Price  Hi-lo store Lower  Medium  Higher  
Baked Beans Coef  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. �ଵRelative Virtue -0.773*** -0.653*** -0.700*** -0.874*** -0.683*** -0.632*** 
 
(-4.77) (-4.88) (-12.43) (-7.41) (-8.96) (-7.62) �ଶ lnPrice -0.269*** -0.314*** -0.357*** -0.344*** -0.362*** -0.318*** 
 (-4.01) (-24.83) (-38.56) (-13.16) (-36.43) (-22.39) �ଷ Relative Virtue × lnPrice -0.504*** -0.413*** -0.522*** -0.619*** -0.518*** -0.458*** 
 
(-3.83) (-4.23) (-12.51) (-6.47) (-9.38) (-7.28) 
Fresh Fruit Juices 
      �ଵRelative Virtue -0.0889** 0.0442 -0.122*** -0.139*** -0.127*** -0.0927*** 
 
(-3.18) (1.23) (-8.94) (-4.67) (-7.85) (-3.75) �ଶ lnPrice -0.290*** -0.405*** -0.360*** -0.430*** -0.359*** -0.316*** 
 
(-7.29) (-18.72) (-44.58) (-20.76) (-36.66) (-21.51) �ଷ Relative Virtue × lnPrice 0.106 -0.00753 -0.139*** -0.163** -0.187*** -0.134** 
 
(-1.02) (-0.16) (-4.92) (-2.84) (-5.81) (-3.20) 
Crisps 
      �ଵRelative Virtue -0.391* 0.129*** 0.105 0.120+ 0.0506 0.0277 
 
(-2.07) (3.47) (1.88) (1.75) (1.03) (0.4) �ଶ lnPrice -1.070*** -1.078*** -1.036*** -0.990*** -1.044*** -1.062*** 
 
(-32.70) (-84.90) (-209.01) (-81.97) (-182.80) (-93.30) �ଷ Relative Virtue × lnPrice -0.168 0.0522* 0.0844** 0.0715* 0.0695** 0.0269 
 
(-1.10) (1.99) (3.12) (2.05) (2.80) (0.70) 
Beer 
      �ଵRelative Virtue -1.511*** -1.847*** -1.981*** -2.056*** -1.962*** -1.911*** 
 
(-13.43) (-14.01) (-44.19) (-42.13) (-34.49) (-30.80) �ଶ lnPrice -0.463*** -0.637*** -0.459*** -0.425* -0.437*** -0.571*** 
 
(-4.02) (-9.28) (-7.36) (-2.50) (-6.01) (-9.62) �ଷ Relative Virtue × lnPrice 1.017*** 0.376** 0.790*** 0.688* 0.660*** 0.850*** 
 
(6.61) (5.74) (8.92) (2.55) (6.72) (11.46) 
+
 p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
t statistics are in parentheses. 
†Control variable coefficients are omitted but are available upon request. 
 
 
